Abstract: This paper reviews the compatibility of government programmes for regularising or relocating informal settlements situated in a growing tourism space in Jamaica, a small island developing state (SIDS). The case study of Ocho Rios involves mapping, charting, and defining this resort town's island tourism space. The paper questions the effectiveness of broad government programmes aimed at addressing informal settlements at a time when governance actors and Jamaica's tourism policy agenda prioritise land use that accommodates a diversified and spatially growing tourism industry. Findings show that government programmes have been insufficiently responsive to informal settlements located in the Ocho Rios tourism space for a number of reasons and that attempts to address the informal settlements are often beset by corruption and a lack of trust between residents and the government. Under the current tourism policy agenda, regularisation of existing informal settlements is not feasible in light of the high real estate value of lands surrounding tourist resort towns. A more targeted approach to addressing informal settlements based on the location of an informal settlement in the vicinity of island tourism regions is required.
Introduction
This paper assesses the compatibility of Jamaican government programmes for regularising or relocating informal settlements located in a growing 'tourism space' in Jamaica. The case study, informed by ethnographic fieldwork carried out in 2006-2009, involved mapping the resort town of Ocho Rios to define and chart growth of its tourism space using attributes and entities related to tourism development. The study sought to assess government initiatives towards an existing informal settlement in the vicinity of the spatially growing Ocho Rios.
As a small island developing state (SIDS), and typical of most Caribbean island states, Jamaica's economy has been largely dependent on tourism earnings since 1985, contributing a large share to the country's Gross Domestic Product as earnings from other sectors of Jamaica's economy have declined (Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica, 1998 Jamaica, , 2006 Jamaica, , 2014 . The concentration of tourism development in major tourist resort towns (Montego Bay, Ocho Rios, Port Antonio, Negril, and Falmouth) (see Figure 1) , has led to rapid urbanisation and population growth in the vicinity of tourist resort towns, resulting in a 'domino effect' in transforming smaller towns. This development of tourism accords with other studies that note how tourism development contributes to the rapid urbanisation of island space (Maguigad et al., 2015b; Pons et al., 2014; Judd & Fainstein, 1999; Mullins, 1991) . Since 1995, tourism policy in Jamaica has promoted growth and diversification of the tourism product to ecotourism, nature and community tourism, heritage tourism, and cultural tourism to increase visitor arrivals to the country (Jamaica Master Plan of Sustainable Tourism Development, 2001). Despite this thrust for alternative tourism, these policies Brooks make no mention of pro-poor tourism. Tourism policy is not linked to sectors such as housing, the environment, and urban planning policies.
Konadu-Agyemang (1991) defines informal settlements as housing that has been rapidly constructed with inadequate access to a safe water supply, inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure, poor structural quality of housing; over-crowding, and insecure residential status. This can express itself, particularly in developing countries, as 'informal urbanism' (Jones, 2016) . Jamaica has a history of informal settlements located in coastal regions (most prevalently in the vicinity of Montego Bay, another major tourist resort town). In the vicinity of Ocho Rios, informal settlements are situated on the outskirts of the resort town but are nevertheless situated in a region susceptible to the spatial growth of tourism. The majority of informal settlements in Jamaica occupy government lands because there is no imminent threat of removal as is the case on privately owned lands (World Bank/Cities Alliance, 2007). Dwellings are usually constructed very quickly with the help of family and friends (usually overnight), using second-hand materials, and acts as a temporary shell as a permanent structure is erected incrementally. Colt (1995) observes that an informal settlement will likely remain undisturbed if out of the public view and if situated on lands not immediately required for development, which is typical of the case study in this paper. In tourist resort regions in Jamaica, informal settlements are generally established in response to a need for affordable housing and tend to be sited close to hotel construction sites and within commuting distance of town centres. The growth of informal settlements is a result of the unavailability of affordable housing, which is typical of developing countries experiencing constraints in macroeconomic policies to meet the demand for low-income housing programmes.
Urban and regional planning and informal settlements in Jamaica
Studies indicate that urban planning in Jamaica has been ineffective in terms of joined-up policymaking that includes economic planning, urbanisation, and housing. There are a number of weaknesses in Jamaica's urban and regional planning system. One fundamental problem is the fragmented nature of the planning infrastructure. Currently, over 20 institutions are directly or indirectly involved in planning and governed by 103 pieces of planningrelated legislation. These institutions often lack capacity. At the systemic level, legislation and plans are outdated. Much of the existing legislation was drafted when Jamaica was experiencing totally different social and economic circumstances and when growth was largely confined to the Kingston metropolitan area and a few smaller urban centres. Planning approaches that worked in the 1940s-1970s are inadequate for today's Jamaica. The system is marked by a lack of robustness to respond to the rate of development taking place in the country and the impacts of globalisation (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2010). This is exemplified by the haphazard physical development of Ocho Rios as a resort town, which intensified in the 1980s, by which time informal settlements already existed. The state's eagerness to institute economic development through tourism has been oblivious to existing informal settlements. Informal settlements have become more prevalent in Jamaica since the 1980s, particularly in towns where economic activity such as tourism exists. The planning process in Ocho Rios was poorly thought out, implying mismanagement: Encouraging tourism investments in the resort town was most likely prioritised over establishing a structured and effective system of town planning (Brooks, 2008 The Jamaican state's response to informal settlements falls into two categories: restrictive/ preventive and supportive policies. Restrictive/preventive policies are a function of the legal and the regulatory framework governing the illegal possession of land. Supportive polices are designed to improve conditions in existing squatter settlements, based on the principle that tenure acts as a stimulus for residents to improve their dwellings. Supportive policies seek to (i) provide land and housing for new low-income settlements, (ii) provide serviced lots to people with the capacity to build their own homes, and (iii) provide sites and services to low-income families (World Bank/Cities Alliance, 2007). Jamaica has in the past incorporated both of these policy approaches, but recent interventions have been implemented on an ad hoc basis and in response to demand for land to facilitate economic activity such as tourism.
A review of government programmes targeted at informal settlements shows that these have largely been broad rather than focused and targeted. An example of a national programme was Operation 'PRIDE' (Programme for Resettlement and Integrated Development Enterprise), implemented during the 1990s. This programme was multifaceted and had as one of its objectives the relocation or regularisation of existing informal settlements. The programme was devised as a grassroots initiative with the intention of giving residents of informal settlements decision-making powers with regard to how communities should be developed. Another feature of the programme was the utilisation of 'sweat equity' (a feature of 1980s development policy), whereby community residents could contribute their labour to the construction of infrastructure, shelter units, or community facilities (ABT Associates, 1996; Shillingford, 1998; Tindigarukayo, 2006; cf. King & Dovey, 2013) . Few informal settlements were upgraded or relocated under this programme (National Housing Development Corporation, 2004). This indicates that the state may have set unrealistic objectives that were impossible to achieve and hints at a relationship of paternalism between government elites and beneficiaries, which contributed to the demise of the programme in early 2000s.
The concept of tourism space
The concept of the 'tourism space' refers to a designated spatial order in which space is controlled and used for tourism activity. Other studies have used the concept or a derivative, noting that the tourism industry's growth potential is reflected spatially and economically (Butler, 1980; Jefferson and Lickorish, 1988; de Kadt, 1979; Britton, 1980; Marek, 2013) . Oppermann (1993) uses the concept of tourism space to devise a model of tourism development comprised of formal and informal sectors. In mapping the five phases of tourism development, Oppermann identifies the spatial changes that occur as tourism moves from one stage to the next, so that: (i) tourism space may consist of core, secondary, and peripheral regions; (ii) tourism enclaves develop in coastal regions with the development of travel corridors; (iii) formal tourism entities are concentrated near infrastructure and domestic airports; and (more indicative of the spatial growth of tourism and relevant to this paper) (iv) there is an "integration of new locations into the tourist space." Three factors can be deduced from and applied to the definition of tourism space: (i) tourism space will grow; (ii) tourism space can be divided into different parts; and (iii) outlying areas can be integrated into tourism space. Tourism space is comprised of three regions. The 'core' tourism space represents the most intensive area of tourism activity, consisting of hotels and attractions. The secondary region is comprised of large hotels, attractions, and shopping outlets as well as residential areas and smaller tourist accommodation facilities. The peripheral region contains similar features as the secondary region, but tourism activity here is less intensive. All of these regions are subject to growth and intensification as more tourism-related entities are established and existing entities are expanded.
In this paper, tourism space paper consists of public and private space comprised of entities linked to tourism activity. Governance processes may encourage tourism space's growth and reconfiguration (Butler, 1980; Oppermann, 1993; Mordue, 2007) . Based on this definition, the presumption is that tourism industry growth leads to increased earnings, which spurs the development of accommodation to meet increased tourist arrivals. The concept of tourism space and its growth is further explained below using Ocho Rios as an illustration.
The resort town of Ocho Rios and the Parry Town informal settlement
Jamaica's topography has encouraged concentration of tourism development in the coastal region because the island's interior is comprised of relatively unproductive mountains, which inhibited early settlement. Jamaica's coastal fringe of fertile, accessible plains complemented by numerous bays suitable for port development stimulated urban settlement along or near the shoreline. Several larger coastal towns became parish capitals because of their existing importance as market towns, communication centres, and ports. This administrative function gave further impetus to growth (McHardy, 2002: 189) . The topography of Ocho Rios is similar, with the coastal area being dominated by the cruise ship industry, hotels, and tourist attractions. Much farther inland are human settlements (formal and informal) and commercial entities, mainly linked to tourism. The town was formerly a fishing village, where tourism development began as a 'cottage industry', spurred mainly by an expatriate population living in the town (Carley, 1963; Hayles, 2006; Johnson, 1995) . Early development of Ocho Rios' tourism space is similar to that described in other studies charting the spatial development of tourism in developing states. Population growth in the Ocho Rios region can be compared with the rate of urbanisation in the parish of St Ann as a whole, where more towns are designated as 'urban' than in the parish of St James (see Table 1 ). Ocho Rios had a higher percentage increase in population growth between 1991 and 2001 than other urban towns in St Ann, while also recording a significant percentage share of the total parish population (cf. Maguigad, 2015b). The Parry Town informal settlement is located 2 miles from Ocho Rios town centre and occupies approximately 200 acres of government-owned land (see Figure 2 ). There is little written historical material about the settlement. This study relied on diverse sources of information, drawing upon oral history accounts given by elderly residents living in the informal settlement and key informant interviews with respondents drawn from various government departments. The lands occupied by the Parry Town informal settlement were formerly owned by a British expatriate, Robin Stuart, who arrived in Jamaica in 1908. His descendants were regarded as pioneers in the start-up of the tourism industry in Ocho Rios (Johnson, 1995) . During the 1970s, the People's National Party (PNP) political party (then led by Michael Manley) increased land taxes, and some of the Stuart family lands were subsequently seized on account of the family's inability to pay these taxes. After the state's takeover, these lands became idle and unused, at which point people began to settle on them illegally. This adheres to the typical way in which informal settlements are established on idle and unused government-owned lands (Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1995; Aldrich, 1995; Eyre, 1972 The informal settlement's layout is characterised by make-shift dwellings constructed of plywood and corrugated metal sheeting for roofing as well as make-shift water closets (showers) and pit toilets, as illustrated by Figures 3 and 4 . These photos illustrate the spatial layout of the informal settlement in Parry Town. Figure 5 shows a pile of construction materials from a dismantled dwelling. These materials can be easily transferred and erected into another make-shift dwelling elsewhere. This indicates that residents of informal settlements live in a state of readiness in anticipation of being evicted at short notice. 
Research Methodology
A grounded approach was used to design the research methodology for this case study. The principle of grounded theory is based on what Glaser (1998: 3) describes as "the researcher entering the research setting with as few predetermined ideas as possible and remains sensitive to the data by recording events and detecting happenings." The grounded approach entails the build-up of a thick description of social life, so that a rich and detailed understanding of particular events is made possible (Seale, 1999) . To this end, qualitative research was wellsuited for understanding the relationship between the spatial growth of tourism and the outcomes of government programmes targeted at an informal settlement situated in Ocho Rios' tourism space. This relationship was key to understanding the intersection between policy response and spatial tourism growth. Stake (1995) observes that case study research is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question. Literature sources and key informant interviews were used to assess the spatial growth of tourism.
Data collection methods included a document review of Jamaican government policies regarding informal settlements as well as interviews with residents of the informal settlement in Parry Town in Ocho Rios and with elite respondents drawn from government agencies. These interviews took place between 2006-2009. In the absence of written data on the informal settlement, oral history interviews were held with older and longstanding residents from the informal settlement, particularly with individuals regarded as 'pioneers' and early settlers of these communities. Bryman (2004) notes that the oral history interview is usually specific in tone in that the subject is asked to reflect upon specific events or periods in the past, the emphasis being less on the individual and more on particular events in the past.
The study also used historical sources to map growth of Ocho Rios' tourism space over a period of time. This data source was essential for illustrating not only physical growth of tourism space over time but also the existence of informal settlements and policy response. The informal settlement in Parry Town continues to exist today. During data collection, one informal settlement was relocated from Roaring River to another location outside of Ocho Rios, and residents of another informal settlement were forcibly evicted from the town of Mammee Bay as the high level of tourism development in the form of new hotel construction took place in Ocho Rios' tourism space. Although the fieldwork took place in 2006-2009, this paper's mapping of tourism space and developments surrounding existing informal settlements points to continued ineffectiveness on the part of the state to address the informal settlement in this island tourist resort region. Since the time of the fieldwork, no new policy measures have been implemented to address this ongoing issue.
It was difficult to carry out a formal sample of the informal settlement in Parry Town. Due to its vast expanse (covering approximately 200 acres), it was only practical to collect data in certain parts of the community. The data for this study needed to reflect variation in the informal settlement's population, based on factors such as period of residence, age, gender, and respondents' engagement with the formal or informal labour market. The aim was also to achieve as random a sample of respondents as possible, necessitating a 'timed sampling' approach. This entailed approaching residents at specific times of the day, at the informal settlement's main entry and exit points. Initially, a brief screening tool was used to establish a resident's period of residence in the informal settlement to determine inclusion in the study. Bulmer (1983: 21) observes that in developing countries it can be challenging to sample in accordance with standard principles because of a lack of precise information on residences and their residents. Quota sampling was used to monitor the sample, to ensure a balance of respondents based on gender, age, and period of residence in the informal settlement. 43 residents from the informal settlement were interviewed for the study. Elite respondents from government agencies were identified through desktop research, informal interviews, and the snowballing method. Elite respondents were considered important for addressing questions surrounding the governance of informal settlements in the context of a spatially growing tourist resort town. These respondents are the gatekeepers of government policy regarding informal settlements. Eighteen elite respondents were interviewed for this study.
In keeping with the grounded theory approach, qualitative analysis of the interview data was reviewed, and perceptions, actions, and experiences were compared between and within the response groups. Interview data was imported into a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software package, QSR NVIVO, making it easier to organise the huge amount of interview data and thus to conduct searches, coding, and assigning of interview transcripts into cases and sets. Reliability of the data was maintained because various mechanisms for recording data were utilised, such as the maintenance of a fieldwork diary, which was updated on a daily basis and acted as an aide memoire for compiling the research results.
Findings: Spatial growth of Ocho Rios' tourism space
A mapping of Ocho Rios shows a growth of tourism space as illustrated in the following diagrams. Personal observation, key informant interviews and literature sources indicated social and economic developments in the country's economy over a period of time, which influenced changes and growth in Ocho Rios' tourism space. Ocho Rios was formerly described as a "tiny fishing village" in which fishermen and informal workers made their livelihoods on beaches in the resort town. Figure 6 shows that, starting in the 1960s, early development of Ocho Rios' tourism space was initially confined to the coastal region of the town, thus taking advantage of the beaches (Carley, 1963; Hayles, 2006; Johnson, 1995) .
The figures below (drawn by the author) depict the development of Ocho Rios' tourism space. Brooks Between 1970 and 1980, the government administration implemented a levy on earnings from the bauxite mining industry, resulting in a withdrawal of multinational mining companies operating in Jamaica. Activities of the multinational bauxite mining industry would have precipitated migration from other Jamaican parishes to the resort town. Some small-scale agricultural activity continued in the peripheral region of Ocho Rios' tourism space. As bauxite mining decreased, the tourism industry grew with the arrival of North American multinational hotel conglomerates (Sheraton and Hilton hotel groups). This development extended growth of tourism space beyond the core region to secondary areas as illustrated in Figure 7 below. In Figure 8 , changes have occurred in the growth of tourist accommodation and the increase and diversity of tourist attractions. Early development of Ocho Rios' tourism space conforms to early stages of tourism development illustrated in the Butler (1980) model of tourism development, which features characteristics of the enclave model of tourism development. A mapping of the development and growth of Ocho Rios' tourism space shows the town has already passed through these stages of development (see Figure 9 ) (cf. Maguigad et al. 2015a) . Based on this model, it can be said Ocho Rios has reached the point of decline in the core and secondary regions of its tourism space, as these areas have become saturated, leading to exploitation of the peripheral region for tourism use. (1,2) The 250-acre Reggae Beach was sold by the state to a Jamaican developer in 2005 and is now a private beach area no longer open to the general public. Irie Beach is now a private beach (the date when the status from public to private changed could not be ascertained, but the author of this article can recall using this beach after 1994 when it was a public beach). In Figure 10 , growth of Ocho Rios' tourism space occurs through the establishment of additional tourism entities over time The intensity and clustering of these tourism entities has led to growth in the core and secondary regions of the tourism space. However, the diversity of tourism attractions led to the establishment and growth of these attractions in the peripheral region where there are land resources, resulting in growth of the tourism space as a whole.
Policy response towards the informal settlement in Parry Town
Residents of the Parry Town informal settlement revealed that they were presented with resettlement plans on several occasions while simultaneously receiving threats of forced removal from government officials. One such instance took place between 2000 and 2004, when residents were served eviction notices by the Ministry of Housing. Despite this, the residents were instructed by government officials to form a Provident Society and pay 'dues' to a community-appointed treasurer. The collected dues were to be deposited into a designated bank account and used for meeting the costs associated with organising community meetings and facilitating the costs of community leaders travelling to Kingston for meetings with government officials.
It was proposed that residents would be relocated to a housing development in Beecher Town, which is 5 km from Ocho Rios and less than 1 kilometre from Parry Town (see Figure  2 ). There are a number of tourist guesthouses and villas in Beecher Town, which indicates that the area is under tourism development. Each resident of the informal settlement was instructed to pay J$30,000 as a downpayment for the plot of land occupied and given the option of paying this amount in instalments. Operation PRIDE would then introduce a low-interest mortgage agreement, at which point the residents could assume possession of these lands. There was no evidence to indicate that a land survey and valuation of these lands had been done and whether the cost was affordable to residents. Residents told the researcher they were given certificates to verify this with an allocated 'plot' number for the land they occupied in Parry Town but were unable to provide documentary evidence. As one respondent said, "We got a certificate with a plot number for the Beecher Town lands […] Got the notice sometime last year, but since then have not heard anything since" (FR9, resident of Parry Town informal settlement). Evidently, this respondent had been on the receiving end of several state-sponsored scams and had become conditioned to this.
Residents said the probable value of the lands was in the region of J$80,000 to J$150,000, but there was no documentary proof of this. The number of residents participating in this scheme could not be ascertained from either the community or from officials at Operation PRIDE. Residents were 'in the dark' regarding what would happen after these developments. As one respondent said: "I don't know how they were planning to decide who could move to Beecher Town, but everybody living here has paid the money to the Ministry of Housing, because everybody here wants somewhere to live. Everybody cooperated with this plan and paid money as they didn't want to hear later on that they could be removed from the land and not have anywhere to go to" (MR1, Parry Town informal settlement).
Two respondents claimed to have not taken part in the scheme, with one female respondent saying, "I didn't pay anything towards the land. I did not have any money at all" (FR5, Parry Town informal settlement). A male respondent questioned the credibility of the scheme: "I never trust these people [the government], which is why I never get involved in the process. I did not see any surveying of the land taking place and so I knew something was not right about it […] If I saw some surveying work going on, then I would know something was going on!" (MR6, Parry Town informal settlement). Some residents made downpayments amounting from J$10,000 to the stipulated amount of J$30,000. Some respondents would not state the precise amount paid, but one respondent who participated said: "We paid some Brooks money towards that, it was about J$10,000.00. I said that I won't be paying anymore. We haven't heard anything about the money, and nobody from the government has come up here to talk to us. I have stopped because I haven't heard anything" (MR2, Parry Town informal settlement). This respondent made a living from a number of jobs, ranging from farming to working in the construction industry when work was available, suggesting residents were highly reliant on earnings generated through the informal labour market. Desperation on the part of residents to legalise their tenure and obtain security on the plot of land they occupied would have prompted residents to perform multiple jobs, including cooperating with family members to acquire the deposit.
Having made the required payments, residents were told by officials at Operation PRIDE that the proposed sale of lands in Beecher Town to the residents had to be abandoned. The reason given was explained by a community leader: "The Beecher Town housing project collapsed when the Ministry of Housing told us that a mistake had been made in the valuation of those lands. After a revaluation, we were told the lands would now cost J$700,000 and upwards for one lot of land." The residents were given the option of purchasing these plots of land at a revised price, but this proved prohibitive for them. The programme objectives of Operation PRIDE were no longer followed, so residents were duped and misled, showing evidence of corruption on the part of state officials. In this regard, the state is an exemplar of bad governance, and interventions under the programme lost credibility while instilling and strengthening a relationship of dependency between the state and residents of the informal settlement. The state assumes a top-down approach, which keeps residents in a position of disempowerment and insecurity, weakening their capacity to proactively negotiate with the state to demand a better outcome. Repeated surveys conducted by state officials among residents only served to heighten residents' hopes. State officials invariably used extra-legal and extra-judicial strategies to address the informal settlement so that the programme objectives of Operation PRIDE were re-worked. The state's handling raises the vulnerability of informal settlements as 'excluded' communities, incompatible with a spatially growing and reconfigured tourist region.
Another attempt was made by the state in 2007 to regularise the residents' tenure, with a view to allowing the residents to remain on the land they occupied in Parry Town. The lands were to be valued and split into separate plots and sold to each family living in the informal settlement. Residents were instructed to pay 20% of the value of each plot of land occupied (assuming that the land had been surveyed and valued in the first place) with promises that the lands would be delivered to them shortly. Valuation of the land would be based on the size of land occupied by each household, which would have proved difficult to ascertain, given that residents had literally 'captured' any plot of land they could get. Broadly speaking, there would have been massive disparities in land values across the informal settlement, indicating that the state had never had any intention of selling the land to residents of the Parry Town informal settlement, considering later estimates quoted the value of land to be in the region of between J$80,000 to J$150,000 (between US$1,165.00 and US$2,185.00). This is a gross undervaluation of lands situated in a major tourist resort town, where land can cost in the region of J$50 million and upwards (amounting to several million United States dollars). The added bonus of a stunning view of the Caribbean Sea from the vantage point of the informal settlement would have significantly increased this value.
High property values in this section of Ocho Rios exacerbate social exclusion by excluding low-and medium-income earners from the housing market, enabling only tourism investors to purchase. Residents were eventually given estimates made by the National Housing Development Corporation (NHDC), which were again deliberately undervalued as the cost of future infrastructure development was not included. A resident spoke about the explanation given by state officials for once again not pursuing the project: "We were told that we couldn't get this land because a development company offered more for the land than what we were able to pay. What they wanted to do was to put in condominiums for tourists because Ocho Rios is close to here. This would be a nice tourism attraction because most tourists nowadays don't want to stay in the main resort town but want to stay in the rural outskirts of the town. The next reason is that this area is seen as a nice forestry area for a botanical garden, for horseback riding, so those were the reasons given why we couldn't get this land here" (MR1, Parry Town informal settlement). This indicates that plans were being pursued for extending the spatial growth of tourism beyond the main town of Ocho Rios. The nearby community of Beecher Town has a number of villas and guesthouses, and the natural environs of the hillside terrain surrounding the informal settlement offer the potential for nature tourism, in contrast to what is offered in the main town of Ocho Rios. Clearly, the mass tourism product is being 'repackaged' in conjunction with a 're-construction' of Ocho Rios as an ecotourism destination.
The residents of the informal settlement had no further contact with state officials: "No further meetings were held between the residents and state officials, when the last meeting was held in February/March 2004" (MR1, Parry Town informal settlement). The aftermath of these failed initiatives raised questions among the residents about the credibility of state policy and programmes, while creating distrust towards government officials. There were suspicions among residents as to whether the state ever intended to relocate the community and concerns about obtaining a refund on deposits paid for the land. However, residents remained guarded in their responses when asked whether they had received refunds under both schemes. As one resident said, "With the land, something should have been done, especially since they said people should pay the money for the land, and up to now we don't know what is happening. You can be here today and hear that you have to leave tomorrow" (MR8, Parry Town informal settlement). Residents were not given the choice to participate in the scheme, but state institutions used Operation PRIDE to take advantage of residents' informal status and desperation for housing. There was no indication of a refund of the money that residents could ill afford to lose, leading to the assumption the state had stolen the minuscule resources of the poor. Despite this huge social injustice, residents still received threats of eviction from the Ministry of Housing. A government official was under the impression that the process of keeping the residents in a state of insecurity had to be prolonged:
We have to keep giving out eviction notices because if you allow the squatter to remain unmolested then you are making him feel comfortable and so you have to remind him that the land on which he is occupying is not his. This is not being done by law but common sense dictates that you need to do this. At the same time, you want to maintain a good relationship with the squatters. As a squatter, you are always aware of the land owner, but he wants when you come to the place that you are as gentle and forgiving with them as possible, so the question is making sure that you [the squatter] are not doing anything to upset the land owner, they always know that the day of reckoning is coming (Interview with the Government's Adviser on Squatter Settlements, Ministry of Housing). This statement encapsulates the state's approach to informal settlements, which is to maintain a sense of insecurity among residents. The 'squatters' are without rights because of their illegal occupation of land, and residents of the informal settlement do not have the right to demand refunds on their deposits. This exacerbates residents' experience of poverty and diminishes their capacity to develop human capital because they are locked in a continuous state of uncertainty and dependency created by the state.
Discussion and conclusion
This study has found that government actions sought to distort and capitalise upon the excluded identities of the supposed beneficiaries of the programme to formalise the informal settlement in Parry Town. Governance of the informal settlement has been reworked and applied on a case-by-case basis rather than as part of an overarching policy. The government interventions are incompatible with Ocho Rios' growing tourism space.
Consideration needs to be given to the viability of relocating informal settlements. State lands are under the control of various government agencies such as the Ministry of Water and Housing, the Commissioner for Lands, and the Urban Development Corporation. Based on departmental priorities and politics, each agency is at liberty to release land at will. The implication is that some government agencies might not be closely scrutinised regarding the disposal of lands to the highest bidder.
Findings also reveal that as tourism space expands, attention is drawn to informal settlements on the periphery. Because state programmes cannot negotiate the tension between the needs of informal settlements and dynamics of tourism space, residents of informal settlements become increasingly excluded. Findings confirm that tourism development has influenced tourism's spatial growth, which has in turn contributed to spatial changes in Ocho Rios and outlying areas. The most recent tourism master plan set the objective of diversifying Jamaica's tourism product while increasing accommodation by 4000 rooms on an annual basis in major tourist resort areas (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2009). This requires land resources to accommodate tourism expansion. However, there is ambiguity regarding the state's approach, which on the one hand seeks to increase earnings from tourism but on the other hand seeks to address informal settlements situated in the vicinity of tourist resort regions.
The growth of Ocho Rios' tourism space has implications for the rural/urban nexus. The spatial growth of tourism into previously designated rural regions has subsumed outlying regions into the tourism space. This suggests that tourism drives urbanisation. Increased hotel accommodation, tourist attractions, and commercial entities have also increased the clustering of these entities along the coasts. This is happening so rapidly that development plans and legislation related to the transformation of the resort town cannot keep pace. While tourism development takes place, the provision of human settlements has been unable to match population migration into Ocho Rios. The apparent schism between economic development and spatial planning can be attributed to the priority placed on economic development as opposed to integrating housing/settlements with economic development. Local government planning authorities are unable to keep pace with this rapid development because central government policies and expenditure take precedence. This has resulted in ineffective programmes and policies addressing informal settlements. The state's unwillingness to implement realistic policies for informal settlements reflects the illegal status of their residents rather than a desire to remove residents from poor living conditions, recalling Byrne's (1999) concept of 'excluded identities'. Generations of families and new arrivals to the informal settlements continue to live in a state of insecurity regarding their land tenure. There are no assurances as to whether acquisition of the said lands can or will occur. Exclusion of the residents is compounded by the government's failure to address the needs of its population and manifests itself in the perceived threats that an informal settlement might pose to the quality of the tourism product and future tourism investment in an island resort town.
The history of policymaking in relation to informal settlements in Jamaica shows periods of highs and lows on the policy agenda. This track record ultimately weakens interventions and reduces the potential for developing effective and sustainable policies. Instead, the issue enters the policy agenda only when a crisis occurs and when the economic agenda, in terms of tourism earnings, is threatened.
At present, the state is considering resurrecting Operation PRIDE now that informal settlements are once again prioritised on the housing agenda, for instance at the Caribbean Association of Housing Finance Institutions' Regional Housing Conference in 2014. Rather than adopting the policy in its previous, non-functional format, it is necessary to rework the policy framework by incorporating a mapping of informal settlements across Jamaica while responding to the demand for land resources earmarked for economic development. Commenting on a similar process in Fiji, Barr (2007) observes that the state's response towards informal settlements was based on a lack of concern for the poor, squatters, and informal settlers, stemming from an internally contradictory housing policy that wavered between a hard approach and compassion, with policies of eviction, resettlement, and upgrading.
The growth of tourism space in island tourist resort regions instead requires a targeted approach to address the resettlement or regularisation of informal settlements. Such informal settlements could be categorised in terms of origin and age, location, size, legality, and vulnerability. Such a typological approach could assist in determining the urgency of efforts to relocate or regularise an informal settlement.
The weakness and incompatibility of policies towards informal settlements in Ocho Rios can be attributed to the role of governance actors in Jamaica's tourism regions. As a rule, government is deemed to be the facilitator of a climate conducive to tourism investment. Tourism investors will have a stake in decision-making processes that affect tourism development and growth. Jamaica's dependence on tourism has led to the country to compromise on its social responsibility to the local population. For this reason, the state's role in addressing informal settlements has been substantively weak because the economic agenda takes precedence, creating the space for tourism stakeholders to influence governance in protecting their business interests in Ocho Rios. Joined-up policymaking is required to overcome these obstacles, but in Jamaica's difficult economic climate, the country struggles to meet the social needs of its population. As outlying areas become part of tourism space, there is an increasing need for a stronger policy approach to existing informal settlements and for preventative and regulatory measures.
